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Abstract The present study investigated whether individual differences between
psychologists in thinking styles are associated with accuracy in diagnostic classifi-
cation. We asked novice and experienced clinicians to classify two clinical cases of
clients with two co-occurring psychological disorders. No significant difference in
diagnostic accuracy was found between the two groups, but when combining the data
from novices and experienced psychologists accuracy was found to be negatively asso-
ciated with certain decision making strategies and with a higher self-assessed ability
and preference for a rational thinking style. Our results underscore the idea that it
might be fruitful to look for explanations of differences in the accuracy of diagnostic
judgments in individual differences between psychologists (such as in thinking styles
or decision making strategies used), rather than in experience level.
Keywords Diagnostic classification · Thinking style · Decision making
Clinical psychologists make multiple decisions and judgments in the process of helping
people with psychological disorders (Garb 2005). Of these, diagnosing or diagnostic
classification of a client’s problems is a very important judgment since it will influence
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the clinical hypotheses and explanations generated, the formulations of prognoses and
eventually the treatment recommendations made (Vermande et al. 1996).
It has been suggested that consulting the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association 2000), which provides
explicit and specific criteria for the diagnosis of the different disorders, is related
to greater reliability, fewer biases and less under- and over-diagnosing than when
classification is done without using such checklists (see Garb 1998). Yet diagnostic
classification is not always done by comparing the client’s symptoms to DSM-criteria.
For instance, it has been found that experienced psychologists compare clients to pro-
totypes (Garb 1996), that the construction of causal relations between symptoms may
influence diagnostic classification (Kim and Ahn 2002) and that diagnosing disorders
may involve the use of intuition (Srivastava and Grube 2009).
In previous research concerning the accuracy of psychologists’ judgments and deci-
sions, a comparison has often been made between novices and experienced psychol-
ogists. In many such studies no significant differences in accuracy are found between
these groups (e.g., see Garb 1998). A recent meta-analysis by Spengler et al. (2009)
suggests that there is a small but reliable effect (d = 0.15) in favour of experienced
clinicians. As the authors point out, this implies that very large samples are needed
to have enough power to find significant results, which may be especially difficult
with this group. Regardless of this, given this small effect size the authors raise the
question whether experience is the best predictor of judgment accuracy. They call
for more research into individual differences between psychologists, aside from their
experience level.
1 The present study
The present study takes a preliminary step in answering this call, by investigating
whether individual differences in thinking styles between psychologists are associated
with accuracy of diagnostic classification judgments. In the judgment- and decision
literature a distinction is often made between thinking processes that are implicit, rapid
and automatic and those that are more likely to be slow, consciously monitored and
deliberately controlled (e.g., Evans 2008). Epstein (e.g., 2010) uses the terms “experi-
ential/intuitive” and “rational/analytical” to refer to this general difference in the way
people process information. These two information processing styles are independent,
and are assumed to operate in parallel and to be interactive. Together they contribute to
behaviour, with their relative contributions varying depending on the situation and the
person (e.g., Epstein 2010). Individual differences in self-assessed ability and prefer-
ence to engage in these thinking styles (“experientiality” and “rationality” as measured
by the rational-experiential inventory, REI; Pacini and Epstein 1999) have been found
to be associated with different personality characteristics and actual judgments and
decisions.
We reasoned that it would be interesting to investigate individual differences in
these thinking styles in relation to the accuracy of psychologists’ diagnostic classifi-
cations. Rationality has been found to be positively associated with higher working
memory capacity and better syllogistic reasoning and negatively with biases (Fletcher
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et al. 2011), which could imply that rationality is positively associated with diagnostic
reasoning as well. On the other hand, results of studies by Corbin et al. (2010) and
Delaney and Sahakyan (2007) indicate that participants with high working memory
capacities, who are, by association, rational (Fletcher et al. 2011), are influenced by
contextual information to a relatively large extent. Contextual information may not
always be relevant for diagnostic classification and may sometimes even be distract-
ing. Higher rationality would then, perhaps rather counter-intuitively, be related to
lower diagnostic accuracy.
As for the other type of thinking process, experientiality, the converse applies. It
has been found to be positively associated with biases and negatively with syllogis-
tic reasoning (Fletcher et al. 2011). By extension this may lead to the assumption
that high experientiality will be negatively associated with diagnostic reasoning and
would then be related to lower diagnostic classification accuracy. On the other hand,
it has been suggested that good judgments do not always require complex cognition
and that heuristic processing can sometimes outperform complex cognitive processing
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010). Rapid heuristic, experien-
tial thinking would then, again maybe counter-intuitively, lead to higher diagnostic
accuracy.
We expect no significant difference in performance between novices and experi-
enced psychologists on the group-level (cf. Garb 1998; Spengler et al. 2009). However,
individual differences between psychologists in their rational and experiential thinking
styles may be associated with diagnostic classification accuracy in either of the direc-
tions outlined above. Rationality may be associated with lower (more distraction) or
higher (better reasoning) diagnostic accuracy, and the same applies to experientiality
which may also be associated with lower (more biased) and higher (heuristic) accu-
racy. Other thinking strategies that psychologists may use to diagnose clients have
been mentioned above and have been identified in previous literature (cf. Elstein and
Schwarz 2002). We included a questionnaire developed specifically for this study to
gauge these strategies and to test their association with judgment accuracy.
2 Method
2.1 Procedure
Participants were invited to participate via an e-mail, which contained a link to the
online experiment. They first answered demographical questions, after which they
filled out the rational and experiential inventory (REI; Pacini and Epstein 1999). Next,
they were asked to provide diagnostic classifications for two case-descriptions of cli-
ents with co-occurring disorders by choosing two out of 20 disorders for each client.
These options were presented on screen in alphabetical order and were kept constant
for the two cases (see Appendix, column 1; note that the English translations of the
disorders results in a non-alphabetical order).
Participants were told they were allowed to consult the DSM (American Psychi-
atric Association 2000) and that they could no longer change their decisions after
pressing the “finished”-button. The two case-descriptions were presented (in an order
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randomized over participants) on separate pages, which included a dropdown menu for
the choice options. A photo of a person’s upper body and face (with a closed mouth),
chosen to be appropriate in age and gender for the clients of the case-descriptions,
accompanied the case-description and was presented again later with the Diagnostic
Decision Making questions (DDM-questions; see Materials) to aid memory. Decision
making time was measured using Inquisit 3 web-edition software (Inquisit 3.0.4.0
2010), from the moment the case-description was presented on the screen until the
participants pressed the “finished”-button.
After the diagnostic classification task, participants were presented with the DDM-
questions. Finally, they were asked how motivated they had been during the diagnostic
task (to be indicated on a scale from 1 (completely not) to 100 (completely) and how
many correct classifications they thought they had provided (confidence).
2.2 Participants
A total of 25 psychologists (Mage = 52.08; SD = 7.66; age range 39–63; 15 female)
formed the group “experienced psychologists”. They had an average of 20.64 (SD =
8.23; range 10–38) years of experience in diagnosing psychological disorders and 84
% worked in private practice. Most indicated to work from a combination of theoretical
orientations of which cognitive-behavioural (72%), mindfulness (32%), behavioural
(32%), psychodynamic (32%), client centered (32%), and psychoanalytical (12%)
were most often indicated. A total of 21 clinical psychology master students (Mage =
23.76; SD = 2.53; age range 21–30; 20 female) with no more than 1 year of experi-
ence formed the group “novices”. Psychologists did not receive compensation for their
participation. Students could enter a raffle in which 10 gift certificates (worth 20 euro
each) were given away, by typing in their e-mail address at the end of the experiment.
2.3 Materials
We used the REI (Pacini and Epstein 1999), which measures the two different thinking
styles. Both scales consist of 20 items (e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions”)
which participants rate on a 5-point scale ranging from definitely false to definitely true.
We used a Dutch translation of the REI which has a satisfactory reliability (Witteman
et al. 2009). Cronbach’s alphas in the present study were 0.83 for rationality and 0.87
for experientiality.
We presented participants with two case-descriptions of clients with co-occurring
psychological disorders, which were taken from the DSM IV-casebook (Frances and
Ross 2001) and translated into Dutch. Case 1 (“A late onset of symptoms”) presents a
client (“Mrs. S.”) with a panic disorder with agoraphobia and a depressive disorder not
otherwise specified. Case 2 (“A tempestuous life”) presents a client (“Ms. C.”) with a
borderline personality disorder and a depressive disorder not otherwise specified (this
client also has a histrionic personality disorder, but this was not one of the options
participants could choose in the present study).
To try to capture how participants performed the diagnostic classifications task,
Diagnostic Decision Making questions (DDM-questions) were created, which were
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based on possible strategies psychologists could have used. Questions related to disor-
ders diagnosed (e.g. “With how many diagnoses did you look at the diagnostic criteria
in the DSM?”) or to the clients of the case descriptions (“With how many clients did
you immediately know which diagnosis was appropriate, without knowing how you
knew?”). Participants were asked to indicate to how many diagnoses (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) or
with how many clients (0, 1 or 2) the particular question was applicable. See Table 3,
column 1 for the DDM-questions and additional introductory information that was
presented to the participants.
3 Results
3.1 Experience level
Novices and experienced psychologists did not differ significantly in their diagnostic
classification accuracy (Mann–Whitney’s U = 235, z = −0.732 ns), decision making
time (U = 250, z = −0.276 ns), and motivation (U = 232, z = −0.673 ns). Novices
were however significantly less confident than experienced psychologists about their
classification accuracy, U = 174, z = −2.164, p = 0.032. See Table 1 for means and
standard deviations of these variables.
Novices and experienced psychologists did not differ significantly in their thinking
styles, neither in their rationality (Mann–Whitney’s U = 185, z = −1.712 ns) nor
in their experientiality (t (44) = 1.461 ns). Novices and experienced psychologists
only differed significantly in one decision making strategy: In how much they thought
about clients seen or read about in the past (DDM-question 5, see Table 3). Experienced
psychologists had these thoughts more, U = 137.500, z = −2.930, p = 0.004.
3.2 Diagnostic accuracy groups
To investigate whether judgment accuracy was related to individual differences
between clinicians aside from experience level, the data of all participants were
Table 1 Mean scores (and SD’s) of classification accuracy and additional variables for novices and expe-
rienced psychologists
Experience level
Novices Experienced psychologists
(n = 21) (n = 25)
Accuracy 1.95 (0.50) 1.84 (0.80)
Decision making time (secs.) 547.43 (355.33) 574.08 (354.83)
Motivation 62.10 (20.27) 63.52 (23.25)
Confidence 2.29 (0.64) 2.80 (0.82)
Rationality 74.62 (7.17) 79.04 (7.80)
Experientiality 72.10 (8.89) 68.24 (8.93)
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Table 2 Mean scores (and SD’s) of classification accuracy and additional variables for the diagnostic
accuracy groups
Diagnostic accuracy groups
0–1 correct 2 correct 3–4 correct
(n = 10) (n = 31) (n = 5)
Accuracy 0.90 (0.32) 2.00 (0.00) 3.20 (0.45)
Decision making time (secs.) 558.92 (364.49) 510.44 (300.59) 887.05 (509.37)
Motivation 61.70 (23.79) 61.29 (22.33) 75.00 (9.14)
Confidence 2.50 (0.85) 2.61 (0.80) 2.40 (0.55)
Rationality 81.70 (4.55) 76.61 (7.64) 70.20 (8.93)
Experientiality 69.70 (7.90) 70.35 (9.46) 68.40 (10.02)
combined and three diagnostic accuracy groups were formed: participants with below
average performance (0–1 correct classifications; n = 10), those with average perfor-
mance (2 correct classifications; n = 31), and those with above average performance
(3–4 correct classifications; n = 5) (see Appendix for the classifications these groups
provided). The groups did not differ significantly in their proportion of novices and
experienced psychologists (χ2(2) = 1.50 ns) nor in decision making time (Kruskal–
Wallis H(2) = 2.50 ns), motivation (F = 0.872 ns), or confidence (H(2) = 0.51 ns)
(see Table 2).
Jonckheere’s test revealed significant trends with DDM-questions 6 and 7, indicat-
ing that the more correct classifications participants gave, the less they had thoughts
about a “prototypical” client (J = 167, z = −2.22, p = 0.023) and the less they
formed a general picture or came to an interpretation or explanation of the client’s
complaints (J = 162.50, z = −2.57, p = 0.012) (see Table 3, columns 1–4).
Results showed that the three groups did not differ significantly in their experiential-
ity scores (F = 0.104 ns) but did in their rationality scores (F = 4.356, p = 0.019).
Participants with below average performance had a nearly significantly higher ratio-
nality than those with average performance (t (39) = 1.986, p = 0.054) and a signif-
icantly higher rationality than those above average performance (t (13) = 3.369, p =
0.005). There were no significant differences in rationality between the latter two
groups (t (34) = 1.706 ns).
3.3 Alternative Analyses with Application of a looser Criterion
For the case “Mrs. S”, 80.4% of the participants correctly diagnosed “panic disor-
der with agoraphobia” and for the case “Ms. C.”, 95.7% of the participants correctly
diagnosed “borderline disorder”. They had more difficulty correctly diagnosing the
“second disorder” which in both cases was depressive disorder not otherwise specified.
Because of this difference it was decided to also score according to a looser criterion
by counting three of the options that closely resemble this (i.c., major depressive
disorder single episode, major depressive disorder recurrent, and dysthymia) as also
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Table 4 Mean scores (and SD’s) of diagnostic classification accuracy and additional variables for the
diagnostic accuracy groups—looser criterion
Variable Diagnostic accuracy groups—looser criterion
0–1 Correct 2 Correct 3–4 Correct
(n = 7) (n = 22) (n = 17)
Accuracy 1.00 (0.00) 2.00 (0.00) 3.12 (0.33)
Decision making time (secs.) 560.73 (390.75) 443.19 (209.29) 716.04 (433.38)
Motivation 58.29 (26.67) 62.45 (24.10) 65.29 (16.77)
Confidence 2.57 (0.98) 2.77 (0.81) 2.29 (0.59)
Rationality 83.71 (3.35) 78.41 (6.94) 72.47 (7.60)
Experientiality 70.00 (8.78) 70.64 (10.51) 69.18 (7.34)
correct. This resulted in the following diagnostic accuracy groups—looser criterion:
0–1 correct (n = 7), 2 correct (n = 22), and 3–4 correct (n = 17) (see Table 4).
All results presented before are also found with this looser criterion. That is, no
significant difference in experientiality (F = 0.121 ns) but a significant difference in
rationality (F = 7.600, p = 0.001) and significant trends with regard to DDM-ques-
tions 6 and 7 were found. Participants with below average performance are now also
found to have a significantly higher rationality than those with average performance
(t (21.89) = 2.723, p = 0.012) and these in turn now also have a higher rationality
than those with above average performance (t (37) = 2.543, p = 0.015). Further-
more, a significant trend with DDM-question 8 is now also found (J = 414.00, z =
2.038, p = 0.042), indicating that the more correct classifications participants gave,
the more they immediately knew which diagnosis was appropriate without knowing
how they knew. See Table 3, columns 5–7, for means and standard deviations for
the DDM-questions, presented separately for the three diagnostic accuracy groups—
looser criterion.
4 Conclusion and discussion
Differences in decision- and judgment accuracy between novice and experienced
psychologists have often been studied, while research into individual differences
between psychologists aside from their experience level has received sparse atten-
tion to date. The present study investigated whether individual differences between
psychologists can be found to be associated with the accuracy of their judgments.
We looked at possible associations between rational and experiential thinking styles
and diagnostic accuracy regardless of experience level, and we investigated whether
specific decision making strategies were associated with accuracy.
No significant difference was found between novices and experienced psycholo-
gists in the accuracy of their diagnostic classifications, which was as expected (cf. Garb
1998; Spengler et al. 2009). But when the data of all participants were combined and
groups were formed based not on experience but on scores of diagnostic classification
accuracy (below average, average, above average), significant associations between
accuracy and individual differences between psychologists were found. These groups
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did not differ significantly in their proportion of novices and experienced psychol-
ogists, decision making time, motivation, confidence or experientiality. They were
however found to differ in their rationality: The higher psychologists’ rationality the
worse their diagnostic classification accuracy was. Next to this, it was found that the
more psychologists thought about a prototypical client and the more they formed a
general picture or came to an interpretation or explanation of the client’s complaints,
the worse their diagnostic accuracy.
It could be speculated that those high in rationality were influenced more by the
contextual information in the case-descriptions (cf. Corbin et al. 2010; Delaney and
Sahakyan 2007) and focused on the “wrong” pieces of information or weighed the
information sub-optimally. In this context it might be interesting to note that those
who provided incorrect diagnoses did so by choosing one of relatively few alternative
diagnoses (see Appendix). Some of these diagnoses can be seen as reflecting parts of
the information given in the case-descriptions.
Although rationality did not correlate significantly with thinking about a proto-
typical client (DDM-question 6; rs = 0.22 ns) or forming a general picture or com-
ing to an interpretation or explanation of the client’s complaints (DDM-question 7;
rs = 0.11 ns),1 it can still be speculated that our significant findings share a com-
mon characteristic. In doing this, it might be useful to make a distinction between
“rational, logical” thinking and “abstract, conceptual” thinking. The rational favour-
ability sub-scale of Epstein’s REI has been found to load positively on both of these
types of rational thinking (Pretz and Totz 2007) and given our results this could raise
the question which of the two (or both) is related to diagnostic accuracy. When spec-
ulating that “abstract, conceptual” thinking is responsible for the negative association
with diagnostic accuracy, it could be reasoned that this shares a common characteristic
with thinking about a prototypical client and forming a general picture or coming to an
interpretation or explanation of the client’s complaints. These may all involve thinking
about things “beyond” the concrete information presented. It could be interesting to
try and manipulate this type of thinking process by having participants provide expla-
nations of the client’s symptoms (“thinking beyond the information”) before asking
them for a diagnostic classification and compare this to participants who should focus
explicitly on extracting symptoms from the information (“sticking to the concrete
information”).
A limitation to the present study could be that conducting it via the internet may
have led to a selection bias. Also, the separate statistical analyses performed in
the present study have not been corrected for an inflation of the type-1 error rate
(cf. Nakagawa 2004). Finally, the conclusion would have been stronger if we had used
more than two cases. When looking at the cases separately, a significant difference
in rationality between the diagnostic accuracy groups and the diagnostic accuracy
groups-looser criterion is found for “Mrs. S.”. For “Ms. C.” the means and mean ranks
are in a similar direction but there are no significant differences.
The results of the present study should be treated with caution given the above lim-
itations and the fact that they do not allow for any causal statements. Replication and
1 Rationality only correlated significantly with DDM-question 2 (rs = 0.39, p = 0.021; all other p’s >
0.086). Experientiality did not correlate significantly with any DDM-questions (all p’s > 0.085).
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extension of this type of research is needed to independently corroborate our findings.
Our results can best be seen as underscoring the idea that investigating associations
between accuracy of judgments and individual differences between psychologists
aside from experience level might be fruitful.
Appendix
See Table 5.
Table 5 Choice options for the diagnostic classification task and percentages of actual diagnostic classifi-
cations given (for diagnostic accuracy groups separately)
Disorder choice option Diagnostic accuracy groups
0–1 Correct 2 Correct 3–4 Correct
(n = 10) (n = 31) (n = 5)
Mrs. S.
(%)
Ms. C.
(%)
Mrs. S.
(%)
Ms. C.
(%)
Mrs. S.
(%)
Ms. C.
(%)
Adjustment disorder 60.0 20.0 58.0 12.9 – 20.0
Antisocial personality disorder – – – 3.2 – –
Bipolar I disorder – – – – – –
Bipolar II disorder – – – 6.5 – –
Borderline personality disorder – 80.0b – 100.0b – 100.0b
Major depressive
disorder—single episode
40.0 – 25.8 3.2 – –
Major depressive
disorder—recurrent
– – 3.2 – – 20.0
Depressive disorder—not
otherwise specified
–
a
–
b
–
a
–
b 100.0a 20.0b
Dysthymia – – 3.2 3.2 – –
Generalized anxiety disorder 50.0 – 3.2 – – –
Factitious disorder – – – – – –
Obsessive-compulsive disorder – – – – – –
Oppositional defiant disorder – 70.0 3.2 16.1 – –
Panic disorder with agoraphobia 10.0a – 100.0a – 100.0a –
Intermittent explosive disorder – 30.0 – 51.6 – 40.0
Schizophrenia – – – – – –
Schizophreniform disorder – – – – – –
Social phobia disorder – – – – – –
Somatization disorder 40.0 – 3.2 – – –
Delusional disorder – – – 3.2 – –
Note Each column with percentages represents the actual diagnostic classifications participants provided
for one of the two cases, “Mrs. S” and “Ms. C.”. They are depicted for the diagnostic accuracy groups
separately, hence 3 × 2 columns with percentages (three diagnostic accuracy groups and two cases). The
percentages per column add up to 200% (or nearly 200% due to rounding), 100% for each of the two
disorders to be indicated per case. A dash (“–“) in a cell stands for 0%.
a Accurate diagnostic classifications for case description of Mrs. S. bAccurate diagnostic classifications for
case description of Ms. C.
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